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INDICTMENT AS BAR TO SUBSEQUENT TRIAL
Defendant was convicted of perjury committed while testifying in defense
to a previous perjury indictment allegedly procured by the illegal conduct
of the government. HeId, that even if the former trial has been illegally
procured, the court had jurisdiction over the crime and the defendant, thus
the defendant was under oath to speak the truth and could not li& with
impunity, and his perjurious statements could be subsequently prosecuted.
United States v. Remington, 208 F.2d 567 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, U.S.L.
Week 3209 (U.S. February 9, 1954).
Acquittal upon criminal prosecution is no bar to subsequent perjury pro-
secution if the falsity of the perjurious statement is not inconsistent with
the innocence of the former crime.' There is a split of authority however,
if a finding of perjury would import a contradiction of the verdict of not
guilty. A majority of the courts hold former acquittal no bar to any perjury
proceedings based on the former prosecution,' although conviction would
necessarily import a contradiction of the verdict in the former case.
It has been held that where a court has the power to proceed to a determi-
nation of the subject matter on its merits, it is a "competent tribunal"
within the meaning of the perjury statute,' even though the indictment inl-
tiating the action is quashed. Thus, the quashing of such indictment does
not preclude subsequent prosecution for perjury at the trial held under the
faulty indictment. 4
Circuit Judge Augustus N. Hand, in the majority opinion,' draws the
distinction, as does Judge Learned Hand, in the dissent,, between United
States v. Williams' and the instant case, in that here the indictment was
not quashed for merely failing to state a cause of action, but rather be-
cause the indictment was allegedly procured by official misconduct.' The
court felt that the perjury was a separate crime, committed after the govern-
ment's supposed wrong and hence within the purview of the aforementioned
rule. Apparently the dissenting opinion took into consideration -lnt only
1. State v. Reynolds, 164 Ore. 441, 100 P.2d 593(1940).
2. Contra: Ehrlich v. United States, 145 F.2d 693 (5th Cir. 1944).
3. 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1948).
4. United States v. Williams, 179 F. 2d 644 (5th Cir.), affd 341 U.S. 70 (1951).
5. United States v. Remington, 208 F.2d 567, 569 (2d Cir. 1954).
6. Id at 571.
7. 179 F.2d 644 (5th Cir.), alfd, 341 U.S. ,70,(1951).
8. In order to examine the contentions of'te defendant the court assumes the
validity of the allegation without passing on it. The court said, "While we need
not decide this question in view of our disposition of the appeal, it should be noted
in passing that it is far from clear that the minutes of the first grand jury proceed-
ing s uport a charge of 'undue influence' sufficient to make the first indictment il-
legal.l See note 9 intra.
CASENOTES
the wrongful acts in the grand jury proceedings," but also the continued
wrongful withholding of information by the government,"' to conclude that
to affirm the conviction would be to allow the government to profit from its
own wrong.
It is apparently well settled that the government cannot use evidence
illegally obtained from a defendant by the government against such defen-
dant."t Judge L. Hand felt that it was therefore only a matter of degree to
further hold that evidence wrongfully obtained from defendant's former wife
while she was a witness, should not be used against the defendant in the
instant case. He went on to say that the case would come under the doc-
trine promulgated in the Nardone case" and the Silverthorne case," where
9. Some of the wrongful acts contended by the defendant were as follows:
First, the prosecuting witness, Elizabeth Bentley, who had accused defendant
of communist ties, depended for much of her income upon the success of a book:
containing this charge. It was alleged that such success depended in turn upon
proving the denials of the defendant to be false. The questionable aspect of these
facts concerns the possibility of collaboration between the foreman of the grand
jury and the prosecuting witness, with the knowledge of the prosecuting attomey,
to obtain an indictment, since the foreman was involved in editorial work for Miss
Bentley and was allegedly to profit from the sale of her book, and the prosecuting
attorney had been Miss Bentley's attorney in an action to recover $7,200 from the
cover job she had held while she was acting as a spy.
Second, the first witness was the attorney who represented Miss Bentley in her
defense of a libel action filed as an outcome of her charges by the defendant. De-
fendant settled out of court for $9,000 in February of 1950.
Third, in the five'days of interrogating defendant, questions of a personal nature
unrelated to the proceedings, and allegedly intended to prejudice the jury, were re-
peatedly asked.
Fourth, Ann Remington, defendant's former wife, who came early in the day to
the $rind jury hearings was questioned for over four hours and denied an oprortun-
ity to rest Or eat. She stated she was tired and hungry and getting "fuzzy' but the
foreman only repeated that she must answer his question and then theycould all go.
Justice L. Hand stated the facts as follows, "Brunini Fthe jury foreman] not only
threatened her with contempt proceedings but express y told her that se had no
privilege [i.e. to refuse to discuss confidential communications between herself
and her husband]. His language is worth repeating: 'Now, I have already pointed
out to you that you have a question from the Special Assistant to the Attorney
General: Did your husband or did he not give this money to the Communist Party?
You bave no privilege to refuse to answer the question.' Read literally, that was
true; but, read as the witness must have understood it - that is, whether her hus-
band had not told her so - it was altogether false. I do not intimate that Brunini,
a layman, thought it false; but Donegan [the Special Assistant to the Attorney
General] was present and he did not intervene to correct the mistake."
10. Te government had notice of the relationship between the grand jury foreman
and the prosecuting witness, yet made no mention of this fact until the defendant
learned of it frqm another source. Further the government opposed the attempts of
defendant to prove these facts at the trial. That the United States Attorney was
under a duty to state and true facts, rather than assuring the trial court, as he did,
that there had been "an utter absence of irregularity" in the grand jury proceedings
see Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935) and Griffin v. United States, 183
F.2d 990 (D.C. Cir. 1950). The actions of the government seem to be a continuous
wrong even after the grand jury hearing.
11. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943) (inadmissability of confession,
wrongfully induced, from Tennessee moonshiner charged with shooting an Internal
Revenue agent of the Alcohol Division).
12. Nararone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939) (inadmissability of evidence
obtained by'wire-tapping;)overruLedOlmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
See also United States v. Bonanzi, 94 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1938); Gouled v. United
States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Silver-
thorne Lumber Company v. United.States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
13. Silverthorne Lumber Company v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). See also
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (cited by Justice Holmes in the Silver-
thorne caset
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in the latter, Justice Holmes stated, "The essence of a provision forbid-
ding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evi-
dence so acquired shall not be used before the court, but that it shall not
be used at all. Of course this does not mean that the facts thus obtained
become sacred and inaccessible. If knowledge of them is gained from an
independent source they may be proved like any others, but the knowledge
gained by the government's own wrong cannot be used by it in the way pro-
posed." Judge L. Hand concluded, "I do not see any difference in princi-
ple between obtaining the first indictment by the unlawful extraction of
evidence, necessary to its support, and obtaining a document by an un-
reasonable search."
Another issue raised by the defense and supported by the dissent was
that of entrapment. This defense has been defined as follows: "When the
criminal design originates, not with the accused, but it is conceived in the
mind of the government officers, and the accused is by persuasion, deceit-
ful representation, or inducement lured into the commission of a criminal
act, the government is estopped by sound public policy from prosecution
therefore.""4 The point being that the defendant had to repeat the alleged
perjurious statements made in the grand jury hearings or else admit the
charge against him. Thus the government induced the defendant to perjure
himself by securing an indictment for perjury against him by illegal means,
when they knew he must inevitably repeat the perjury in his defense, but
without the procuration of the indictment there could have been no perjur-
ious statements. The court, however, rejected this rather broad interpretat-
ion of entrapment and added that it was inconceivable, to the court at
least, that the government would deliberately procure a false indictment in
the hope of later obtaining perjurious statements at the trial since such
statements could be more easily procured in a new grand jury proceeding.
Although the entrapment argument does not seem very forceful, in the
light of the cogency of the argument that the doctrine of the Silverthorne
case" is applicable, as well as the repugnance to public policy of the per-
haps illicit or at least questionable actions of the government, the dissent-
ing opinion seems to contain a more accurate appraisal of the law involved.
Barton S. Udell
JURIES - VERDICTS -AFFIDAVITS
NOT PERMITTED TO IMPEACH
The defendant was found guilty of rape. After trial a juror's affidavit re-
vealed that, although convinced of the defendant's innocence, he failed to
object to the verdict because of a mistaken belief that a majority vote of
14. Sorrells v. United Stares, 287 U.S. 435 (1932). See also Butts v. United
Stares, 273 Fed. 35 (8th Cir. 1921).
15. 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
